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I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
Our problems are man-made.  
Therefore, they can be solved by man. 
 
—President John F. Kennedy, 19631 
 
When America has been threatened in the past, the U.S. government has relied 
upon the civilian and private-industrial sectors for specific expertise and engineering 
capacity to improve military capabilities. In other words, the national security 
establishment frequently taps into civilian resources and expertise, but in turn absorbs 
those factors into its internal organizations and processes. It may be time to look yet 
again at this traditional paradigm of national security. As cyber capabilities continue to 
complicate the conflict space, the necessity of civilian and private-sector technology 
experts is not lessening; in fact, with the advent of cyberwarfare, they are in even greater 
demand. It may be time to rethink how societal cyber communities may assist in national 
security.  
Observers of the hacker community have explored the question of hackers 
assisting the national security apparatus in combating this emerging threat.2 These 
“hacktivists” could conceivably augment ongoing national security efforts in some form 
of a “hacker militia” that would utilize their pre-existing skill sets to bridge identified 
strategic and operational gaps that exist throughout the U.S. government, and are 
particularly problematic within Special Operations Command (SOCOM) and U.S. Cyber 
Command (CYBERCOM). This study offers a framework for enlisting the untapped 
potential of the hacker community to improve the cyber capacity of both national security 
entities.  
                                                 
1 John F. Kennedy, “American University Speech” (speech, American University, Washington, DC, 
June 10, 1963). http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/features/primary-resources/jfk-university/. 
2 I am The Cavalry, “Overview of The Cavalry,” accessed July 5, 2016. 
https://www.iamthecavalry.org/about/overview/. 
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A. THE PROBLEM  
Today, regional powers such as Russia, China, India, Indonesia, Brazil, 
Nigeria, South Africa, Turkey, and Iran assert growing power and 
influence…Sub-state actors (e.g., clans, tribes, ethnic and religious 
minorities) seek greater autonomy from the central government. The 
complex nature of the future operating environment will often render 
traditional applications of the diplomatic and economic instruments 
ineffective. 
—General Joseph Votel, 20163 
 
Offensive cyber threats from alleged state sponsors such as China and Russia 
have exposed operational and strategic gaps for the national security apparatus. Former 
Commander of SOCOM, General Joseph Votel says the “gray zone” is “characterized by 
intense political, economic, informational, and military competition more fervent in 
nature than normal steady-state diplomacy, yet short of conventional war.”4 In such 
forms of conflict, all tools of state—and societal—power are at play.  
The emerging cyber conflict space perfectly aligns with Votel’s concerns. 
Exploitable vulnerabilities in this interconnected world range from individuals’ identities 
to power grids and the facilities that house weapons of mass destruction to elections. 
According to the Department of Homeland Security’s Industrial Control Systems Cyber 
Emergency Response Team (ICS-CERT), “in the first half of Fiscal Year 2015 (October 
2014 through April 2015), ICS-CERT responded to 108 cyber incidents impacting critical 
infrastructure in the United States. As in previous years, the energy sector continues to 
lead all others with the most reported incidents.”5 In an interconnected world, 
corporations are legitimate hacking targets; consider the cyber hacks of Sony, Target, and 
the most recent distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks that significantly interrupted 
services and operating speeds “to dozens of sites, including Twitter, Netflix, Spotify, and 
                                                 
3 Joseph L. Votel et al., “Unconventional Warfare in the Gray Zone,” Joint Force Quarterly 80 (1st 
Quarter 2016): 105. 
4 Ibid., 102. 
5 Department of Homeland Security, “Incident Response Activity.” ICS-CERT Monitor (May/June 
2015). https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/Monitors/ICS-CERT_Monitor_May-Jun2015.pdf. 
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Airbnb, for millions of Americans,” as TIME magazine reported.6 Looking at these 
numbers, the immediacy of the threat is readily apparent—and growing.7  
SOCOM should look at all avenues to develop capacity to respond in the cyber 
gray zone. As the government embraced private sectors in the past, the proposition of 
engaging volunteer hacktivists to leverage their pre-existing skill sets to counter the threat 
of future cyber-attacks justifies serious consideration.  
B. PURPOSE AND SCOPE 
The purpose and scope of this thesis is to assess, analyze, and eventually develop 
a method to determine how the U.S. government might effectively mobilize and leverage 
existing human capital from the hacker community to improve the capacity to defend and 
appropriately respond to cyberattacks. The scope focuses on the utility of militias, and 
assesses the conditions under which they can be fruitfully engaged in this realm. Further 
investigation explores the utility of the hacker community and their ability to effectively 
counter cyber threats, thereby complementing the ongoing efforts by the national security 
apparatus. Can the U.S. government improve national cyber security and effectively 
bridge the existing operational and strategic gaps within SOCOM and CYBERCOM, 
with unconventional cyber entities via nontraditional means? 
C. EXISTING RESEARCH ON “STATE-SOCIETY” RELATIONSHIP FOR 
NATIONAL SECURITY 
The United States has grappled with maintaining an interdependent relationship 
between the government and the private sectors since the creation of America. 
Governments have always been “confronted with the interrelation of commercial, 
financial, and industrial strength on the one hand, and political and military strength on 
                                                 
6 Haley Sweetland Edwards and Matt Vella, “A Shocking Internet Attack Shows America’s 
Vulnerability,” TIME, October 27, 2016. http://time.com/4547329/a-shocking-internet-attack-shows-
americas-vulnerability/. 
7 Lee Rainie, Janna Anderson, and Jennifer Connolly, “Cyber Attacks Likely to Increase,” Pew 
Research Center, October 29, 2014. http://www.pewinternet.org/2014/10/29/cyber-attacks-likely-to-
increase/. 
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the other”8 and have struggled to balance on the one hand the control offered by 
mercantilist policies, and on the other the economic benefits that come from liberalism. 
The political economy aspects of grand strategy, in fact, should be predicated on these 
basic questions of how (and how much) societal resources and processes need to be 
funneled into national security.9 How are the dynamics of state-society relationships 
changing? First, the information age may be making the traditional structures of 
government unable to meet the demands of a rapidly evolving and ambiguous threat 
environment. Second, if this is the case, then pre-existing societal human capital—such 
as hackers—may be tapped into directly, rather than being processed and absorbed into 
(or generated within) the traditional national security apparatus. Finally, the special 
operations forces (SOF) community may be a uniquely evolved “touch point” to engage 
and manage such societal assets in the service of protecting the nation.        
Writing a decade ago, Blanken and Goldman suggested that “we are situated 
precisely at the transition between the industrial and information ages, the ability to adapt 
is critical.”10 Their argument appears accurate, as the last ten years has seen a tremendous 
turn from the industrial age to the accelerated power and vulnerability of the information 
age. The number of devices connected devices to the Internet of Things (IoT), for 
example, continues to grow exponentially. This single concept embodies the changing 
way in which the strategic environment is moving beyond the traditional battlespace. 
Jacob Morgan explains IoT as follows: 
Simply put, this is the concept of basically connecting any device with an 
on and off switch to the Internet (and/or to each other). This includes 
everything from cellphones, coffee makers, washing machines, 
headphones, lamps, wearable devices and almost anything else you can 
think of. This also applies to components of machines, for example a jet 
engine of an airplane or the drill of an oil rig. As I mentioned, if it has an 
on and off switch then chances are it can be a part of the IoT. The analyst 
                                                 
8 Edward Mead Earle, “Adam Smith, Alexander Hamitlon, and Friedrich List: The Economic 
Foundations of Military Power” in Peter Paret, ed., Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the 
Nuclear Age (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 217. 
9 Kevin Narizny. The Political Economy of Grand Strategy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007).  
10 Emily O. Goldman and Leo J. Blanken, “The Economic Foundations of Military Power” 
(University of Pittsburgh, Matthew B. Ridgway Working Paper #2006-12, 2006), 2. 
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firm Gartner says that by 2020 there will be over 26 billion connected 
devices.11 
The IoT will disturb the state’s pursuit of traditional industrial power because information 
power, on account of globalization, is manifested at a much faster rate than industry and 
manufacturing capacity.12  
As the IOT grows, the U.S. government (USG) will need to reevaluate the 
hierarchical organizational structure of the entities tasked with defending and responding 
to cyber threats. To underscore the speed at which the government must be able to adapt, 
I will explore Moore’s Law. Moore’s Law was an attempt by Gordon E. Moore in 1970 
to predict the exponential growth in the world of digital electronics. Moore predicted that 
“processor speeds, or overall processing power for computers, will double every two 
years.”13 Taking a moment to reflect on the technological advances humanity has made 
over the past 30 years lends some validity to his projection. Given this change of pace, 
the access to information technology will increase. And with this proliferation of access, 
Blanken and Goldman suggest, “The information revolution has diffused and 
redistributed power to traditionally weaker actors.”14 And it is these weaker actors who 
will utilize cyberattacks as their preferred strategy against stronger actors, thereby 
exacerbating ongoing cyber security efforts of the USG.15 
Advances in technology and information systems within the government, 
financial, and economic sectors have significantly stimulated these sectors’ operating 
capacity in this ever more interconnected and globalized world. With the many 
opportunities that these innovative systems provide come a wide array of vulnerabilities. 
Blanken and Goldman, suggest “Information-dependent societies are also more 
vulnerable to the infiltration of computer networks, databases, and the media, and to 
                                                 
11 Jacob Morgan, “A Simple Explanation of ‘the Internet of Things,’” Forbes, May 13, 2014, 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/jacobmorgan/2014/05/13/simple-explanation-internet-things-that-anyone-can-
understand/#158dadb86828. 
12 Goldman and Blanken, “The Economic Foundations of Military Power,” 11. 
13 “Moore’s Law,” accessed March 15, 2016, http://www.mooreslaw.org/. 
14 Goldman and Blanken, “The Economic Foundations of Military Power,” 6. 
15 Matt Bishop and Emily Goldman, The Strategy and Tactics of Information Warfare, 121. 
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physical as well as cyberattacks on the very linkages upon which modern societies rely to 
function: communication, financial transaction, transportation, and energy resource 
networks.”16 The sheer number of cyberattacks against USG and private sector 
enterprises exhibit how the U.S. is one of these information-dependent societies. Specific 
examples include a 2014 case brought before the U.S. Department of Justice that 
“indicted five Chinese military hackers for computer hacking, economic espionage and 
other offenses directed at six American victims in the U.S. nuclear power, metals and 
solar products industries.”17 North Korea’s 2014 cyberattack of Sony Pictures 
Entertainment is another violation which exposed “executives’ embarrassing emails, 
salary information and more.”18 Furthermore, the Central Intelligence Agency, in 
December of 2016, “concluded in a secret assessment that Russia intervened in the 2016 
election to help Donald Trump with the presidency, rather than to just undermine 
confidence in the U.S. electoral system.”19 The ambiguity surrounding each of the 
aforementioned cases only points to the need for an overhaul of the USG entities tasked 
with defending against and responding to challenges from within the gray zone. The 
private sector’s effective use of horizontal organizational models could prove to be a 
beneficial example of how America can maintain an advantage over her enemies. The 
vertical organizational construct of the majority of USG entities, will make it difficult for 
the United States and her allies to maintain the initiative against sophisticated asymmetric 
cyber threats from state and non-state actors who possess information technology that 
once required national infrastructure and funding to procure.20  
                                                 
16 Goldman and Blanken, “The Economic Foundations of Military Power,” 6. 
17 Office of Public Affairs, “U.S. Charges Five Chinese Military Hackers for Cyber Espionage against 
U.S. Corporations and a Labor Organization for Commercial Advantage,” Department of Justice, May 19, 
2014. https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/us-charges-five-chinese-military-hackers-cyber-espionage-against-us-
corporations-and-labor. 
18 Zeke J. Miller, “U.S. Sanctions North Korea over Sony Hack,” TIME, January 2, 2015. 
http://time.com/3652479/sony-hack-north-korea-the-interview-obama-sanctions/. 
19 Adam Entous, Ellen Nakashima, and Greg Miller, “Secret CIA Assessment Says Russia Was Trying 




20 Matt Butler, “Rapid Delivery of Cyber Capabilities: Evaluation of the Requirement for a Rapid 
Cyber Acquisition Process” (graduate research project, Air Force Institute of Technology, 2012), 1. 
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According to a 2015 SOCOM white paper, “Not every non-state [or state] actor in 
the gray zone deserves significant attention, and a useful benchmark for concern is when 
belligerent ambitions and operational reach become transnational.”21 However, when one 
actor violates the sovereignty of another within the realm of technology or within an 
information systems platform, it is deemed an act of cyber warfare.22 Cyber warfare is a 
signature example of a Gray Zone challenge. Coffman et al. argue that “in the Gray Zone, 
where lethal and non-lethal requirements ebb and flow, there is no clear delineation of 
which focus takes priority, whether the enemy or the people. Comprehension of sensitive 
and powerful relationships in play is paramount when designing campaigns with a high 
probability of enhancing policy and national interest.”23 With such a wide problem set, 
the following will narrow the focus and identify an unconventional method to bolstering 
the resources and capacity of the USG to increase cyber security initiatives. Drawing 
from the causal mechanisms founded in the case study section, I intend to determine the 
utility of a militia derived from volunteer hacktivists who possesses the pre-existing skill 
sets necessary to augment ongoing national cyber security efforts. 
“Militia” is a provocative word today. Nations have, however, mobilized and 
contracted private actors to assist in national security throughout history. From the 
issuance of letters of marque to privateers on the high seas, to the utilization of private 
security firms in recent decades, the state has often chosen to partner with private sector 
entities, rather than to produce all capabilities “in house” (within the uniformed 
services).24 Recent research by Gavra, however, suggests that the militia concept may be 
revived, not to produce more combat power, but to rather garner other skills from the 
                                                 
21 United States Special Operations Command, “The Gray Zone” (white paper, September 9, 2015). 
22 John Arquilla, “From Blitzkrieg to Bitskrieg: The Military Encounter with Computers,” 
Communications of ACM 54, no. 10 (October 2011): 58. 
23 Sean R. Coffman, Jeffrey Givens, Robert Shumaker, “Perception Is Reality: Special Operations 
Forces in the Gray Zone” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2016), 18. 
24 On privateers see Janice E. Thomson. Mercenaries, Pirates, And Sovereigns. (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1996). On private security firms see P.W. Singer. Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the 
Privatized Military Industry. Second edition. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007) 
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society that may be difficult for military services to recruit for or train for.25 Cyber 
hacking skills are a perfect example that justifies exploration here.  
How does the SOF community play a role here? SOF operators are selected and 
trained to engage and persuade communities that may be reticent to work in alignment 
with U.S. interests.26 Though the community engagement for which they train is usually 
a tribe in the mountains of Afghanistan, it could conceivably be a hacker community 
often at odds with U.S. government rules and policy. Effectively paired with SOF, 
volunteer hacktivists could utilize their pre-existing skill sets to defend and respond to 
transgressions in the cyber realm. Similar to how Russia demonstrated its ability to 
prepare every aspect of the battlefield, to include cyber, during its siege of Ukraine, a 
volunteer hacker militia could complement ongoing USG efforts in Phase Zero 
operations, preparation of the battlefield, and improving transition efficiency during 
offensive operations. To maximize the potential utility of volunteer hacktivists, the 
hacker militia would be integrated early and often with SOF elements.  
Hacktivists possessing specific skill sets could identify and improve the 
vulnerabilities in SOF’s commercially procured warfighting technology, but their utility 
would be fully realized when they comprehend the SOF mission. With a knowledge and 
understanding of how SOF operates, volunteer hacktivists can then predict and 
preemptively resolve future vulnerabilities in warfighting technology before those issues 
would have otherwise been realized. Adversaries such as China and Russia are actively 
meshing governmental, military, and civilian cyber programs into a comprehensive 
strategy. Failing to leverage the existing national human capital could limit the 
capabilities and resources of ongoing USG cybersecurity initiatives. 
  
                                                 
25 Daniel V. Gavra, “Militias: Exploring Alternative Force Structures for National Defense” (master’s 
thesis, Naval Post Graduate School, June 2014), 70. 
26 Jessica Glicken Turnley. Cross-Cultural Competence and Small Groups: Why SOF Are The Way 
They Are. (Tampa: Joint Special Operations University Report 11-1, 2011) 
 9 
D. METHODOLOGY 
The methodology of this thesis uses primarily qualitative methods. More 
specifically, I employ “Heuristic case studies [to] inductively identify new variables, 
hypotheses, causal mechanisms, and causal paths.”27 The two case studies explore the 
colonial rebels of the American Revolution and the Polish Territorial Defense Forces 
(TDF). The basis for selecting these two militias is that many of the threats targeting 
present day Poland represent the hybrid challenges aimed at the USG by its adversaries. 
In response, Poland has invested in a model that its country has relied upon for 
generations, one that is representative of the colonial militia forces of the American 
Revolutionary War. Spanning over 200 years and occurring on opposite ends of the 
globe, the two studies will be used to identify generalizable factors that “uncover causal 
mechanisms” relevant to the phenomenon of militia recruitment.28 In each case, the pre-
existing human capital of the citizenry has, albeit by different methods, mobilized to 
augment national security efforts. The contributions of these volunteer militias have 
greatly increased the overall capacity of their respective conventional or unconventional 
entities.  
In an increasingly interconnected world, operational and strategic gaps are being 
exposed by state sponsored cyberattacks. While these attacks do not resemble those 
experienced on the fields of Lexington and Concord or the edges of Poland’s sovereign 
state, I seek to explore whether an unconventional mobilization of the citizenry, might be 
utilized to augment the resources and capacity of SOCOM and CYBERCOM. 
  
                                                 
27 Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social 
Sciences (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), 75. 
28 Ibid. 
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II. THE NEW HIGH GROUND: HOW CHINA AND RUSSIA 
LEVERAGE THE CYBER DOMAIN TO PROMOTE THEIR 
NATIONAL AGENDAS 
The utility of the emerging cyber domain has been fully realized by nation-states 
and non-state actors alike. “The Department of Defense invented the Internet, and the 
possibility of using it in warfare was not overlooked even in its early days.”29 Beginning 
in 1994, the Department of Defense created the Joint Security Commission to address the 
vulnerabilities posed by networked technology. The commission discovered three main 
points.  
Information systems technology…is evolving at a faster rate than 
information systems security technology. The security of information 
systems and networks [is] the major security challenge of this decade and 
possibly the next century and…there is insufficient awareness of the grave 
risks we face in this arena. The report also noted that the increased 
dependence in the private sector on information systems made the nation 
as a whole, not just the Pentagon, more vulnerable.30 
In response to the commission’s report, the Clinton administration initiated the 
Presidential Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection, which developed the 
National Plan for Information Systems Protection. However, as Richard A. Clarke and 
Robert K. Knake mentioned in their book Cyber War: The Next Threat to National 
Security and What to Do about it, the government lacked the willingness “to regulate the 
industries that ran the vulnerable critical infrastructure.”31 
Following the devastating Oklahoma City bombings, the Clinton administration 
tasked Air Force General Marsh with establishing a committee to evaluate the 
vulnerability of the country’s critical infrastructure. What became known as the Marsh 
Committee consisted of leaders in industry, education, and the various government 
agencies. The results of the numerous Marsh Committee meetings held around the 
                                                 
29 Richard A. Clarke and Robert K. Knake, Cyber War: The Next Threat to National Security and 
What to Do about it (New York: Ecco, 2010), 34. 
30 Ibid., 104. 
31 Ibid., 109. 
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country found that “the chief challenge [was] the role of the private sector, which owned 
most of what counted as critical infrastructure,” as Clarke and Knake summarized it.32  
Following cyberattacks such as Solar Sunrise in 1999, and Moonlight Maze, 
which hacked data systems and unclassified government computers for years, to a DDoS 
attack in 2000 that targeted online commerce sites, the incoming Bush Administration 
was in a unique position to fully comprehend threats generating from cyberspace. As 
such, the Bush administration implemented the Comprehensive National Cybersecurity 
Initiative and National Security Presidential Decision 54. As noteworthy as these efforts 
were, their attempts at establishing an “information warfare deterrence strategy and 
declaratory doctrine,” as well as securing the financial and economic sector, were futile. 
In the end, these actions did little more than improve network security for internal 
government networks.33 
Realizing the world is more interconnected politically, economically, and 
militarily, than ever before, President Obama encouraged many new cybersecurity 
initiatives. According to a 2015 report to Congress by the U.S.-China Economic and 
Security Review Commission, “As the largest and most web-dependent economy in the 
world, the United States is also the largest target for cyber espionage of commercial 
intellectual property.”34 With the many complexities the cyber domain presents, 
specifically attribution following an attack, improved relationships between the United 
States, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and Russia offer the possibility to create an 
environment that facilitates improved accountability for individual actors operating 
maliciously in the cyber domain. 
So far, collaboration efforts with world powers such as the PRC and Russia have 
been compromised due to a vast array of malicious acts and disputes over the handling of 
the cyber domain. Initiating a solution will require a common lexicon and an 
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understanding of the foundations of the national agendas of these powers. As Franklin D. 
Kramer, Stuart H. Starr, and Larry K. Wentz write in Cyberpower and National Security, 
“Without close study of these and the approaches of nation-states to cyber issues, it 
would be akin to playing a game of basketball in which your focus was solely on your 
team’s offensive and defensive philosophy while disregarding your opponent’s skill set 
and strategy.”35 Cyber assets are being used to advance specific national interests that 
must be understood in order to be countered.  
There are similarities and differences between the PRC’s and Russia’s cyber 
strategies. While both utilize the cyber arena to advance their own national agendas, there 
are considerable differences in each country’s strategy and tactics.36 However, before 
discussing these distinctions, it is imperative to recognize how the context of the words 
cyber, network, and information varies between the PRC, Russia, and the United States.  
A. TERMINOLOGY MAKES A DIFFERENCE 
Examining how the United States, the PRC, and Russia differentiate the meaning 
of the words cyber, network, and information is an essential first step to improving 
communications between the rival nations. Furthermore, such efforts could prevent 
potentially catastrophic misunderstandings during public addresses and declarations made 
by heads of state.  
As Amy Chang writes in Warring State: China’s Cybersecurity Strategy, at the 
most basic level, the “term ‘cyber’ is rarely used [in China or Russia] and not fully 
congruent with how the term is understood in the U.S. policy community.”37 To 
underline this point, Mikk Raud, researcher from the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence 
Centre of Excellence, states “the Chinese term closest to what would translate as 
cyberspace merely entails the necessary components of a connected device and actions 
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related to it. For the Chinese, cyberspace is thus only a subset of information space—the 
landscape for the largest scale communication to the world’s population.”38 The inability 
to properly navigate policy discussions and public discourse with the appropriate lexicon 
has the potential to compound the already complicated process of resolving cybersecurity 
issues in the international arena.  
In a statement for the record to the Senate Select Committee in 2014, James 
Clapper, Director of the National Intelligence Agency, stated, “Russia and China 
continue to hold views substantially divergent from the United States on the meaning and 
intent of international cyber security. These divergences center mostly on the nature of 
state sovereignty in the global information environment states’ rights to control 
dissemination of content online, which have long forestalled major agreements.”39 
Differences aside, going forward, I will be using the National Academy of Sciences 
definition of cyberattack as “the use of deliberative actions to alter, disrupt, deceive, 
degrade, or destroy adversary computer systems or networks or the information and/or 
programs resident in or transiting these systems or networks.”40 Using this term, China 
and Russia’s strategic agendas will be explained.  
B. CHINA’S STRATEGIC AGENDA 
The United States and China have discussed cybersecurity, however, they 
currently lack the proper level of dialogue to mitigate confrontation in cyberspace. To 
encourage healthier discourse, it is necessary to improve our understanding of China’s 
strategic agenda and identify the governmental entities responsible for its foundations. 
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China’s cybersecurity strategy can be categorized into political, economic, and 
military subcategories.41 Amy Chang, research associate at the Center for a New 
American Security, unpacks China’s national strategic agenda: 
China’s foreign policy behavior, including its cyber activity, is driven 
primarily by the domestic political imperative to protect the longevity of 
the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Ensuring domestic stability, 
territorial integrity, modernization, and economic growth, while 
simultaneously preparing for the possibility of militarized cyber conflict in 
the future, are all objectives that directly or indirectly support the 
continuation of CCP rule. China espouses laws, norms, standards, and 
agreements in bi- and multilateral fora that allow for sufficient flexibility 
of interpretation to serve domestic needs and interests.42 
The above summary highlights how integral the cyber domain is to promoting the 
CCP’s national agenda. And to operationalize their initiatives, the CCP created the Third 
and Fourth Departments. In his article “Assessing the Chinese Cyber Threat,” Larry 
Wortzel identifies an uncertain relationship between “China’s military intelligence 
collection and cyber reconnaissance infrastructure, [which] supports a coordinated effort 
to combine civilian and military cyber programs and improve both offensive and 
defensive capabilities.”43 Furthermore, he highlights that the “PLA General Staff 
Department (GSD) Third Department and Fourth Department are organized and 
structured to systematically penetrate communications and computer systems, extract 
information, and exploit the information.”44 
The American Foreign Policy Council’s e-journal, Defense Dossier, illuminates 
how “China’s cyber strategy extends beyond the PLA and into the civil and commercial 
spheres. Several U.S.-China Economic and Security Commission reports have expressed 
concerns about some of China’s largest telecommunications firms, [who] benefit from a 
network of state research institutes as well as government funding in programs that have 
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affiliation or sponsorship of the PLA.”45 According to a 2015 report to Congress by the 
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, “China causes increasing harm 
to the U.S. economy and security through two deliberate policies targeting the United 
States: coordinated, government-backed theft of information from a variety of U.S.-based 
commercial enterprises and widespread restrictions on content, standards, and 
commercial opportunities for U.S. businesses.”46 These discoveries “reveal two 
overarching trends in China’s thinking: consolidating political leadership over cyber 
issues, and framing the internet as part of China’s national strategy.”47  
The PRC has skillfully meshed government and private industry, with civilian 
counterparts, to collectively promote the national agenda of the state. Given the 
foundations of the PRC’s national agenda, the creation of the Integrated Network 
Electronic Warfare (INEW) should have been anticipated. The INEW reveals “a formal 
IW strategy…that consolidates the offensive mission for both Computer Network Attack 
(CNA) and Electronic Warfare (EW).”48 Until a proper defensive strategy is confirmed 
by the U.S., the 2015 Annual Report to Congress on U.S.-China Economic and Security 
Review Commission maintains that  
hackers working for the Chinese government—or with the government’s 
support and encouragement—[will continue to infiltrate] the computer 
networks of U.S. agencies, contractors, and companies, and [steal] their 
trade secrets, including patented material, manufacturing processes, and 
other proprietary information. The Chinese government has provided that 
purloined information to Chinese companies, including state-owned 
enterprises, in a major application of cyber espionage.49  
The book Unrestricted Warfare, written by two former colonels in the People’s 
Liberation Army, Qiao Lang and Wang Xiangsui, specifically identifies a multitude of 
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ways in which unconventional warfare can be employed against an enemy to prepare the 
battlefield and then capitalize on discovered weaknesses when the opportunity presents 
itself. The book’s introduction notes, “The doctrine of total war outlined in Unrestricted 
Warfare clearly demonstrates that the People’s Republic of China is preparing to confront 
the United States and our allies by conducting ‘asymmetrical’ or multidimensional 
attacks on almost every aspect of our social, economic, and political life.”50 The means 
by which the PRC hopes to achieve the basic tenets of its agenda draws similarities with 
Russia’s infamous Gerasimov Doctrine, which I will explain in the following section. 
Both strategies describe how a “new form of warfare, which borrows from the ancient 
wisdom of Sun Tzu and his doctrines of surprise and deception, also employs civilian 
technology as military weapons ‘without morality’ and with ‘no limits’ in order to break 
the will of democratic societies.”51 China’s emerging cyber strategy, which effectively 
blurs the lines between government, military and civilian cyber programs, presents a 
complex gray zone challenge for the national security apparatus.  
C. RUSSIA’S STRATEGIC AGENDA 
Realizing the utility of the cyber domain, Russia developed the Information 
Security Doctrine in 2000. Timothy Thomas, author of “Nation-State Cyber Strategies,” 
says the doctrine “presented the purposes, objectives, principles, and basic directions of 
Russia’s information security policy.”52 According to David J. Smith’s article “How 
Russia Harnesses Cyberwarfare,” Russia’s strategic aims include a “much broader 
approach to information operations than do most western countries.”53 These sorts of 
tactics have escalated tensions throughout Europe and the West. Russia’s approach to 
achieving its agenda highlights the interwoven relationships of the government with the 
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private industry and contracted forces.54 As Azhar Unwala and Shaheen Ghori write in 
an article for Military Cyber Affairs, 
In official and unofficial doctrine, Russia typically refers to a holistic 
concept of “information warfare,” which encompasses cyber espionage, 
cyberattacks, and strategic communications. Russia’s official view of 
cyber power stems from its “Information Security Doctrine,” dated 
September 9, 2000. This document affirms a long-standing policy of state 
influence over the media, arguing that the government must ensure pro-
Russian messaging regardless of whether media sources are state-
controlled or private.55 
Kenneth Geers’s book Cyber War in Perspective: Russian Aggression against 
Ukraine provides insight into Russia’s strategic culture and how cyber warfare in 
particular is being leveraged to promote their national agenda. “Russian cyber activities, 
especially those associated with the recent conflict in Ukraine and the annexation of 
Crimea, probably offers the best example of the employment of cyberattacks to shape the 
overall political course of a dispute.”56 The main issue of these disputes is the perceived 
aggression of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) against the sovereignty of 
Russia. 
NATO, a collective of sovereign nations determined to “contribute to the security 
of the North Atlantic area,” infringes on Russian hegemony of the region.57 Recognizing 
the strengths and weaknesses of the NATO alliance and how the balky Western decision-
making process relies so heavily on information before action, Russia successfully 
manipulated the strategy and relationship of NATO instead of participating in 
conventional direct engagement. By reducing the “death and destruction associated with 
any fait accompli to an absolute minimum,” Russia exploited these gaps and limited 
NATO’s ability to respond with conventional escalation.58 
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James J. Wirtz’s article “Cyber War and Strategic Culture: The Russian 
Integration of Cyber Power into Grand Strategy” further unpacks Russia’s tactics: 
Russia opted to pick a course of action not to defeat NATO, but to defeat 
NATO’s strategy. By presenting the Western alliance with a fait accompli 
through actions that produce minimal death and destruction, Russia 
attempted to shift the onus of escalation onto NATO, thereby inflicting a 
strategic defeat on the Alliance at the outset of hostilities or even in the 
event of non-democratic changes to the status quo.59 
While Ukraine is not a member of NATO, Russian exploitations against a 
sovereign country, echoed throughout the region. Further application of Russia’s efforts 
in this space are well documented. As reported in a New York Times article, James R. 
Clapper, director of national intelligence, “warned Senate officials this year that Russia 
was escalating its espionage campaigns against the United States,” using cyber espionage 
groups such as APT29 and APT28 whose targets are also targets of the Russian state.60 
Unlike hacktivist groups such as Anonymous and New World Hackers, “APT28’s 
targeting of … the Caucasus (especially Georgian government), Eastern European 
governments and militaries, and specific security organizations”61 validate suspicions of 
Russian state sponsorship.  
Russia’s masterful exploitation of the cyber and information arena raises many 
questions about its future conquests. Russia’s actions should encourage member countries 
of NATO to accelerate the timeline for finding consensus on the obscurities that remain 
in NATO’s current doctrine and laws. Many of Russia’s tactics and procedures were 
revealed during its exploits in Estonia and Georgia, and they must be studied and 
compared to the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation from February 5, 2010. 
Unwala and Ghori write, “This doctrinal update codified reforms to transition Russia’s 
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mass-mobilization, Soviet-era military to a modern, highly mobile force. One of these 
reforms was the development of ‘forces and resources for information warfare.’”62  
Russian chief of general staff Valery Gerasimov was deemed the appropriate 
leader for this overhaul. General Gerasimov articulated his plan in a 2013 publication that 
has become widely known as the Gerasimov Doctrine.63 Unwala and Ghori explain, 
Gerasimov recognizes that future conflicts must include an information 
element, which can asymmetrically lower an adversary’s combat potential 
in addition to creating a “permanently operating front through the entire 
territory of an enemy state”…Modern warfare should also rely on covert 
action, special operations forces, and private contractors until the final 
stages of a conflict when success is guaranteed.64 
If NATO hopes to correctly predict Russia’s next move, its actions in Georgia, 
Estonia, and Crimea have exposed many tactics and procedures (TTP) that must be 
exploited. Furthermore, to engage this hybrid threat, it would behoove the U.S. 
government to leverage cyber entities and improve cyber policy so that an effective, 
timely, and appropriate response can be achieved.  
D. LESSONS LEARNED 
While conducting cyber operations, the PRC and Russia have exposed many 
capabilities and weaknesses in their quest to achieve the coveted seat at the cyber 
domain’s highest ground. Throughout the research collection, I have found that both 
countries take aim specifically at the United States in the form of cyber espionage. 
Intellectual property theft in particular has a substantial return on investment and bolsters 
much-needed economic initiatives in each country. Admiral Mike McConnell, former 
national security advisor under the Clinton administration and director of national 
intelligence during the Bush administration, Michael Chertoff, former secretary of 
homeland security, and William Lynn, former deputy secretary of defense, stated in the 
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Wall Street Journal in 2012 that “it is more efficient for the Chinese to steal innovations 
and intellectual property than to incur the cost and time of creating their own.”65 Had the 
conversation in the opinion piece been about Russia, the verdict would remain the same, 
according to David Smith’s article “How Russia Harnesses Cyberwarfare.”66  
Amy Chang writes, “Evidence of China’s intrusive cyber activity against U.S. 
national security infrastructure and industry is abundant. …China has exfiltrated critical 
information from foreign businesses, governments and militaries.”67 Case in point, the 
2015 intrusion into the Office of Personnel Management, where “U.S. government 
databases holding personnel records and security-clearance files exposed sensitive 
information about at least 22.1 million people, including not only federal employees and 
contractors but their families and friends.”68 According to FBI director James Comey, the 
price tag of such actions by China against the United States alone is estimated to be 
billions.69 Robert Miller, Daniel T. Kuehl, and Irving Lachow write in an article for Joint 
Force Quarterly, “The United States needs to consider the implications of information 
and infrastructure operations and decide explicitly what it wishes to do about them. To 
not decide potentially allows others to decide for us.”70 
Improved dialogue between the United States, the PRC, and Russia has the 
potential to facilitate understanding that creates discourse, which in turns fosters a chance 
for deterrence, specifically tailored deterrence. Kramer, Starr, and Wentz explain tailored 
deterrence as a concept that “suggests that important alliances (such as NATO) must 
develop a holistic philosophy that understands the goals, culture, and risk calculus of 
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each of the potential adversaries, develops and plans for capabilities to deter these 
adversaries, and devises a strategy to communicate these concepts to the potential 
adversaries.”71 Without such a comprehensive plan, malicious cyberattacks that lack 
attribution could lead to escalatory attacks by states and non-state actors. Whether or not 
this form of tailored deterrence is fostered by all parties, secondary or tertiary effects of 
initiatives to facilitate a holistic, whole-of-government approach with the PRC and Russia 
could improve overall accountability of rogue actors through enriched information 
sharing and communication.  
E. CONCLUSION 
Russia’s transgressions in the Baltic states and China’s purported hack into the 
Office of Personnel Management are but two of many examples of how nation-states are 
applying cyberwarfare strategy to promote their own national agendas. Admiral 
McConnell stated that China is “the world’s most active and persistent practitioner of 
cyber espionage today, [but] it is Russia’s actions in the Baltics that specifically have me 
fascinated.”72 Geers writes that the manner in which Russia was able to “masterfully 
[exploit] the information gleaned from its worldwide computer network exploitation 
campaigns to inform its conduct, purposely distort public opinion, and maintain its 
dominant position in Ukraine” is momentous and speaks volume for the overall utility of 
present-day cyber operations.73  
The lack of timely and effective responses by the USG and NATO demonstrates 
the complexities of cyber gray zone challenges. The responses that did eventually 
materialize, underscored Washington’s ambivalence towards the situation.74 The 
characteristics of the cyber domain appear to be as asymmetric as can be, and because of 
this the United States must acknowledge her shortfalls and learn from the techniques, 
tactics, and procedures demonstrated by Russia and the PRC.  
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Miller, Kuehl, and Lachow suggest, further conversations should focus less “on 
dominating or controlling the cyber sphere, [which is reasonably] unhelpful, since the 
real touchstone of success is effective use rather than physical control. The former is 
possible, and the latter is probably not—which, of course, is exactly the way that the Air 
Force and Navy describe air and maritime superiority.”75 Contemplating cyberspace 
ownership as if it were strictly territory will not facilitate a solution to the current 
problem. Fortunately, SOCOM entertains an alternative view of the battlefield.  
The 2014 Special Operations Joint Publication 3-05 states that “Special operations 
considers the totality of the cognitive, informational, physical, cultural, and social aspects 
of the operational environment to influence relevant populations, enhance stability, 
prevent conflict, and when necessary, fight and defeat adversaries. SOF capabilities 
complement CF capabilities.”76 The aforementioned doctrine of special operations is 
unlike any other in the services. As such, SOCOM appears to be the government entity 
best equipped with the knowledge and capacity necessary to achieve operational and 
strategic success in the gray zone. Paired with cyber warriors from CYBERCOM and 
leveraging the pre-existing skill sets of American hacktivists, the alliance may generate 
the appropriate resources and capacity necessary to respond and defend against future 
cyber threats.  
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III. MILITIAS: UPDATING AN OLD IDEA  
America’s efforts to counter INEW and the Gerasimov Doctrine are summarized 
in the “Department of Defense Cyber Strategy” from April 2015 which outlined its four 
strategic goals—“Build and maintain ready forces and capabilities,” “Defend the DOD 
information network,” “Be prepared to defend the U.S. homeland and U.S. vital 
interests,” and “Build and maintain robust international alliances to deter shared threats 
and increase international security and stability.”77 While the U.S. clearly recognizes the 
necessity of a comprehensive cyber strategy, critics identify issues with the current 
strategy and the organizational construct of the entities tasked with responding and 
defending cyberattacks. 
Dr. Robert Miller and Dr. Daniel Kuehl, professors in the Information Resources 
Management College at the National Defense University, propose a possible solution. 
They introduce a more comprehensive term to U.S. policymakers: information and 
infrastructure operations (I2O).78 Collaborating with Lachow, they write, “The purpose 
of an I2O would be to disrupt, confuse, demoralize, distract, and ultimately diminish the 
capability of the other side. These are not weapons of mass destruction, although they 
could have destructive secondary effects; they are more paralytic in nature—and are thus 
weapons of both mass and precision disruption.”79 In essence, the term describes what 
each side is currently doing or preparing to do as critical infrastructures such as the 
Internet become more interdependent and hypothetically more resilient. The ability to 
identify and then strike against and weaken a nation’s critical infrastructure may have 
greater utility than investing in a singular, historically dominant weapons system.80  
Russia has demonstrated to the world that it possesses a comprehensive 
assortment of tools and tactics to subvert perceived state security and global alliances 
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such as NATO. One specific tool is the Russian employment of private contractors to 
further complicate the gray zone challenge. Similarly in China, the “increase in Chinese 
civilian and military research on network security over the years reinforces [the state’s] 
leadership prioritization of formulating and funding research into network security 
technologies and strategies.”81  
Fortunately, leveraging American human capital fits the American experience as 
well. American colonial rebel forces and Poland’s Territorial Defense Forces (TDF) are 
separated by a 200-year period. Nevertheless, useful parallels can be drawn between their 
dispositions and organizational structures. Surging the ranks when threatened and 
operating autonomously or on the periphery of major conventional operations, the 
militia’s utility in “defending the community it represents” continues to be realized 
today.82  
A. AMERICAN COLONIAL REBELS 
American colonial rebel forces incorporated a revolutionary strategy to achieve 
victory over British forces during the American Revolutionary War. In his book The 
American Way of War, Russell F. Weigley discusses how the strategy of hybrid warfare, 
pioneered by Nathanael Greene, “violated the principles of concentration” and allowed 
for the independent use of regular and irregular forces against a far superior enemy to 
leverage that enemy’s strengths against it.83 This strategy was fundamentally different 
than those that had been used before and most certainly than the one employed by 
General George Washington, who preferred a much more “conventional mode of war.”84 
Born out of necessity, the independent irregular forces would leverage their 
strengths against the larger and far superior conventional British force. The utility of 
conventional and irregular forces waging guerilla warfare and harassment operations 
against British general Burgoyne and his force of 10,000 men caused significant impacts 
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to supply lines that degraded a force which was initially far superior in size and strength 
to the colonial rebel forces.  
The concept of hybrid warfare was progressive because in previous battles, 
irregular militia forces never enjoyed full autonomy from their conventional counterparts. 
Utilizing strategic positioning, independent irregular forces would later exploit General 
Cornwallis’s strengths and use them against him. Cornwallis’s temperament toward 
militia forces and his aggressive thirst for direct confrontations with a standing army 
caused him to blindly pursue American colonial rebel forces. As such, Cornwallis would 
often overextend his larger and far superior force. This meant the larger, less mobile 
conventional British force, hamstrung by its long lines of communications, became more 
vulnerable and susceptible to attack from the smaller, more agile colonial rebel forces.  
Military theorist Carl Von Clausewitz hypothesized that strength is composed of a 
combination of force and will.85 Much focus is spent on the aspect of force, but will, is 
equally important. Another military theorist, Mao Tse-Tung, also emphasized the human 
aspects of success on the battlefield.  
Weapons are an important factor in war, but not the decisive factor; it is 
people, not things, that are decisive. The contest of strength is not only a 
contest of military and economic power, but also a contest of human 
power and morale. Military and economic power is necessarily wielded by 
people.86 
Unified under the guidance to avoid direct engagements with the far larger British 
forces and to wage a “no-holds-barred campaign of harassment against his outposts and 
supplies,” as Weigley puts it, conventional and irregular forces descended upon the 
British forces.87 Their efforts effectively “[wore] away the resolution of the British by 
gradual, persistent action against the periphery of their armies.”88  
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Initially, Continental Army leadership was met with the difficulty of recruiting 
Southern colonials to join the revolutionary cause. However, a massive British failure in 
the Southern campaign soon galvanized the population. Not fully understanding their 
point of victory and not realizing they had attained their political objective in Charleston, 
General Cornwallis and the British forces proceeded to push further west, away from 
their port city strongholds. General Cornwallis’s encroachment into the west had two 
major effects. One, infringing upon the lands of a Southern population that was once 
apathetic to the rebel cause fostered what Mao called a “mobilization of the people,”89 
with widespread anti-British sentiment that swelled the ranks of local militias.90 Two, the 
British overextended their reach attempting to crack down on rebel sympathizers and 
generate direct engagements with colonial rebels. The multiple attempts at expanding 
beyond the safeguards of their encampments and safe harbors exposed vulnerabilities and 
flaws in British supply chains, mobility, and their ability to adapt to the rebels’ fluid 
tactics.  
The British forces, limited in their ability to maneuver outside of their large 
encampments and port cities, lost their historic conventional strength, the navy—a 
strength they had utilized to overwhelm scores of previous enemies. The true strength of 
the British armed forces and the reason they had been able to maintain their global 
hegemony was their navy. Without question, the British Navy was the best the world had 
ever seen. However, “the Americans were so poverty-stricken militarily that they could 
not be made much poorer,” so the practicality of blockades was a fruitless endeavor.91 
Without a colonial rebel navy to fight against and because the British did not possess a 
naval force large enough to prohibit shipments to America from sympathetic countries, 
the British Navy’s strength was all but negated. The strength that the British had enjoyed 
for many years could not discourage the colonial rebel forces, who were capable of living 
off the resource-rich landscape and were strengthened by generous allied support. 
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The usefulness of this historical case study is twofold. The utility of the militias is 
relatively easily understood in this historical orientation. However, erasing the labels of 
the protagonist and antagonist from this historical reference could explain the current 
situation of the USG. The situation represents a conventionally minded America 
struggling in Iraq and Afghanistan against a seemingly faceless and amorphous collective 
group of irregular forces like al-Qaeda or ISIS. Likewise, modern-day state-sponsored 
hackers operating in the shadows appear to represent the colonial rebel forces and 
America’s lethargic modification of its historically successful conventional tactics and 
strategies represent the British predicament. Failing to adapt historically successful 
organizational structures, strategies, and tactics to contemporary gray zone challenges 
will limit the capacity of the USG to handle threats from cyber space.  
Examining the case study of the colonial rebels is meant to identify the force 
multiplying capacity and utility of a mobilized population when conventional forces are 
limited by their resources. In Poland, military forces and volunteers are mobilizing to 
repel the recent hybrid threats from Russia. Poland’s Territorial Defense Forces play an 
integral role in complementing its nation’s standing army in its effort to counter Russian 
hybrid threats.  
B. POLAND’S TERRITORIAL DEFENSE FORCES 
Poland has enjoyed a long tradition of using its whole society against adversaries. 
Beginning late in the 18th century and for a subsequent 123 years, Poland was without its 
sovereignty.92 In the face of overwhelming aggression by larger nation states such as 
USSR, its population mobilized under the banner of resistance movements. Utilizing their 
pre-existing knowledge of the local terrain and conducting reconnaissance operations 
against the enemy, the resistance proved to be a tremendous resource in recapturing 
Polish sovereignty. A senior GROM officer acknowledged that “the defining 
characteristic of the Polish people is to resist; resistance is our national heritage.”93 This 
tradition is now being revived in the face of Russian aggression. 
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During World War II, “most elements of resistance to the German regime 
organized under the banner of the Home Army (Armia Krajowa). …The Home Army 
became one of the largest and most effective underground movements of World War II. 
Commanding broad popular support, it functioned both as a guerrilla force, conducting a 
vigorous campaign of sabotage and intelligence gathering, and as a means of social 
defense against the invaders.”94 Ensuing violence and instability in the years following 
World War II, looked to destabilize the state. However, in 1999, Poland joined NATO 
and affirmed its independence.95 Familiar with the benefits of the resistance and 
recognizing its utility in the face of hybrid threats from Russia, the Territorial Defense 
Forces role in the Ministry of National Defense has recently been re-evaluated. The 
results allocate increased funding of TDF equipment and training in order to better 
support their internal TDF and external Polish armed units.96  
Polish Defense Minister Antoni Macierewicz stated that the TDF developments 
are aimed at renovating the training regimen of the Polish “civilian volunteers to form a 
National Guard-style paramilitary force aimed at preparing for a ‘hybrid war’ with 
Russia.”97 The TDF force, which is aspiring to reach 53,000 by 2019, will be trained by 
both active and retired members of the Poland’s GROM, 1st Special Regiment. The 
percentage of GROM special forces personnel currently within the ranks of the TDF is 
approximately 10%.98 This significant percentage of special forces representation in the 
TDF, speaks volumes for its utility in the overcoming Poland’s gray zone challenges.  
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Defense Minister Macierwicz stated, “These units are the cheapest way to 
increase the strength of the armed forces and the defense capabilities of the country.”99 
Once operationally capable, each of Poland’s 16 regions, beginning on the Eastern front, 
will receive a brigade size element of volunteers, with the exception of the region 
surrounding the capital city of Warsaw, which will receive two brigades.100  
While in support of a May 2016 Naval Postgraduate School’s Center for Network 
Innovation and Experimentation (CENETIX) exercise conducted in Poland, I had the 
distinct pleasure of working with members of Poland’s special forces units and their 
TDF. I participated in the CENETIX exercise in predominantly a technical support 
function, as the goal of the project was to verify the practicality of various 
communications platforms in austere locations. Working predominantly with the 
Jednostka Wojskowa, who are more commonly known as GROM, Poland’s elite special 
forces operators, I observed how the TDF’s unique capabilities were leveraged to benefit 
the overall operation. Though I will sidestep mentioning specific tactics, training, and 
procedures (TTPs) to keep this paper unclassified, the TDF effectively prepared and 
secured the battlefield in a manner which could only be done by individuals who were 
distinctly familiar with their particular area of operations.  
Following the completion of the week-long training exercise, a senior officer from 
the MOD Bureau of the Territorial Army, conducted his debrief with the TDF. In that 
meeting was Kami C. Kami is a professional security researcher for a Polish technology 
company who also represents the regional TDF element as their executive officer. The 
two men explained to me the disposition of the civilian volunteers; similar to the hackers 
who volunteered to assist in the Hack the Pentagon program, the force represented all age 
groups, from high school teenagers to retired teachers who felt a calling to serve their 
country. Recent transgressions by Russian and rebel forces along the Polish border were 
the predominant motivating factor for TDF members to have joined the ranks.101 
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Kami explained how their TDF leadership had received training from the GROM 
and an Illinois National Guard unit, which he said was “extremely beneficial in the realm 
of logistics and organization of a military unit,” skills that improved his effectiveness as a 
leader on the ground.102 Witnessing the impression senior GROM forces had on the 
young TDF members was especially memorable.  
A senior GROM officer described how the partnership between the GROM and 
TDF typically worked for major operations. Similar to Nathaniel Greene’s forces in the 
American Revolution, the TDF operated on the periphery of the front lines. The 
particular exercise I participated in concluded with a direct-action mission on a vehicle of 
interest (VOI). The TDF effectively prepared and secured the battlefield surrounding the 
VOI clandestinely, using only a footprint big enough to accomplish the mission but 
remain undetected as they maintained blocking positions. While some TDF members 
teased the senior GROM officer that “the TDF had done all the leg work for the training 
exercise and that the GROM did nothing but jump in and landed on the ‘X’ to do the fun 
stuff,” the roles of both forces is clearly understood and respected.103 Colonel Remigiusz 
Żuchowski, from the Bureau of the Territorial Defense Implementation, further clarifies 
the TDF’s role alongside the main fighting forces of Poland. He classifies, “their role in 
the security system as the fifth branch of the Polish Armed Forces [next to the Army, 
Navy, Air Force and Special Forces].”104  
In an environment such as Poland, where hybrid threats take the form of regular, 
irregular, cyber, and information, Polish conventional forces, the GROM, and TDF have 
responded with a unified plan of action that will hopefully secure their boundaries in the 
face of recent Russian belligerence. The empirical evidence collected in Poland has led 
me to believe there is a correlation between the utility of the 1st Special Regiment’s 
influence on TDF operations in Poland and the the effects of a similar enterprise between 
SOCOM and a hacker militia.  
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In the American Revolution, British blunders in the predominantly Loyalist South 
mistreated the citizenry and created a fantastic recruiting opportunity for local militia 
leaders, whose ranks began to swell with support. Similarly, in 2016, Poland perceived 
Russian aggression to be imminent. Under threat of hybrid attacks “the idea of 
resurrecting Poland’s territorial defense units [which had been abandoned in 2008] 
gained traction following Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its support for rebels 
fighting in eastern Ukraine.”105 And in America, in the face of increased cyberattacks, 
the trend continues. Hacktivists have mobilized to pursue individual initiatives to 
safeguard vulnerabilities in networks and software, and the Department of Defense 
announced it had reached its recruitment milestones and achieved initial operating 
capability of all 133 Cyber Mission Force Teams operating under CYBERCOM.106  
As such, the timing appears palatable to introduce the idea of a vetted hacker 
militia to serve in concert with and at the service of the national security apparatus. 
Witnessing firsthand the benefit of integrating unlikely partners in operational scenarios 
in Poland with the TDF and GROM, I was encouraged to research the utility of an 
initiative that would utilize militia forces in a manner that opts for laptops over 
Kalashnikovs. Observing the progressive relationship between the TDF and GROM, I 
began to investigate how SOCOM could benefit from a hacker militia.  
The mastery of specific computer-based skills and the holistic understanding of 
working in cyberspace sets qualified hacktivists apart from today’s standing armies.107 
These pre-existing skills are extremely difficult to teach, and amid the current crisis, they 
could be leveraged to complement the national security apparatus’s strategy for 
combatting cyber threats. In his article “Analysis from the Edge: Information Paralysis 
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and Decision Making in Complexity,” Nicholas R. Dubaz likens the volunteer groups 
from the hacker community to “edge organizations…because they operate at the ‘edge’ 
of a theoretical command-and-control space that is diametrically opposite to traditional 
military organizations.”108 Dubaz says they are “uniquely situated to develop 
understanding, with their unconstrained ability to engage all actors in a system and 
achieve information superiority.”109 Unfortunately, the organizational construct and 
bureaucratic processes within the U.S. government and national security apparatus lack 
such agility. 
SOCOM’s white paper “The Gray Zone” further underscores the issue; “We 
struggle when dealing with challenges not fitting neatly into our traditional models. No 
organization in the U.S. government has primacy for gray zone challenges, so it is 
unsurprising our responses lack both unity of effort and unity of command.”110 
Challenging that assertion, Special Operations Joint Publication 3-05 states, “SOF are 
selected, trained, and equipped to conduct all forms of IW.”111 Incorporating a vetted 
hacker militia under the leadership of SOCOM for offensive and defensive operations, 
may facilitate reciprocal benefits.  
A discussion with Dr. Herb Lin, senior research scholar for cyber policy and 
security at Stanford University, highlighted the parallels between the battlefields in which 
special operations forces and hackers operate. Both battlefields represent asymmetric 
environments where conventional, unconventional, cyber, information, and other threats 
thrive. “Like special operators,” notes National Defense magazine, “they will be asked to 
operate across all phases of the campaign. But they will be most valuable at the 
beginning, when they can shape the strategic environment and dissuade and deter kinetic 
operations from occurring.”112 Operational and strategic gaps exist that SOF, 
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CYBERCOM, and the hacktivist community can work to overcome to improve the 
overall capacity of all entities.  
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IV. MEET THE HACKERS: THE POTENTIAL FOR ENGAGING 
THE CURRENT CYBER COMMUNITY  
The term “hacker” was initially used for skilled computer enthusiasts that 
could ‘hack’ their way through technical problems. Today, hackers pose 
one of the principal threats against our information infrastructure by 
exploiting vulnerabilities in code and circumventing security measures. 
Hacking uses a wide variety of techniques with differing intentions and 
objectives. And in order for security professionals to protect against this 
threat, we must assess the security of our networks from the perspective of 
the hacker. 
—Chris Peake, 2003113 
 
The volume and severity of cyberattacks by state and non-state actors against the 
U.S. government, her critical infrastructure, and her financial sectors continue to rise at 
an alarming rate.114 Tasking the U.S. military with combatting this new threat may not be 
the appropriate near- or long-term solution. Consider the genesis of CYBERCOM, which 
is tasked with the planning, coordination, integration, synchronization, and coordination 
of offensive and defensive cyber operations, and how it was established on June 23, 
2009, decades after the first documented cyberattacks against the United States.115 
Tapping the military for the solution to cyber threats would be a form of inertial 
innovation. As James Callard and Peter Faber wrote in their article “An Emerging 
Synthesis for a New Way of War,” “Inertial innovation tends to align itself too closely to 
the lessons learned from the past. It builds on past successes, and either minimizes or 
ignores the counter-innovations being developed by real or potential adversaries.”116 In 
short, the accomplishments the military has accrued in the past 15 years of conflict, 
though commendable, do not necessarily translate into service members having the 
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capacity to confront this new enemy at the current moment in time. CYBERCOM and the 
combined cyber capabilities of the USG are insufficient for the challenges of cyber 
offense and defense.  
Even if the government were to build a parallel structure with the expertise 
necessary to try to handle the current threats of cyber warfare, these experts, hamstrung 
by the limits of bureaucracy and lengthy acquisitions processes, would continuously be 
playing catchup in their attempt to keep pace with developing threats in the cyber realm. 
The massive role played by private corporations such as Booz Allen, Science 
Applications International Corporation, and the scores of other contractors who run and 
staff USG computer and cyber operations cannot be overstated. However, “Because we 
are situated precisely at the transition between the industrial and information ages, the 
ability of organizations to adapt is critical. …How much of a threat or a challenge a 
particular modernizing military or terrorist group represents depends in large part on its 
capacity to assimilate new technologies and leverage new capabilities.”117  
Appreciating how the government’s bureaucratic protocols inhibit its ability to 
rapidly respond to expanding cyber threats and the private sector’s concerns with 
increased governmental regulations, the U.S. government instead could utilize the pre-
existing skill sets of its citizenry and forge a hacker militia to complement ongoing 
cybersecurity initiatives. Leaders from the hacker community such as Beau Woods 
maintain that volunteers have already mobilized against cyber threats and want to extend 
their knowledge and expertise. Unfortunately, the hacker community lacks the rapport the 
national security apparatus and private sector currently enjoy. However, positive 
outcomes from the Hack the Pentagon event in April of 2016 could provide a template 
for a hacker militia as a complimentary option to ongoing efforts by the government.  
In an historic initiative, in line with the administration’s Cyber National Action 
Plan of 2016, the Department of Defense invited “vetted hackers to test the department’s 
cybersecurity under a unique pilot program. The ‘Hack the Pentagon’ initiative is the first 
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cyber bug bounty program in the history of the federal government.”118 The positive 
results from the program support the hypothesis that unconventional methods, may 
effectively complement the national security apparatus’s ongoing cybersecurity 
initiatives. 
The following will examine popular hacktivist groups such as Anonymous, New 
World Hackers, Telecomix, and The Cavalry. Objectives and targets of the various 
groups vary widely, from public safety initiatives to utilizing DDoS attacks to shut down 
governments who censor social media and the freedom of information.119 This blurred 
line of legal and illegal activities that hackers appear to tread so brazenly has contributed 
to the greater public’s negative opinion of the hacker community. This perception stifles 
necessary dialogue with the hacktivist community that has the potential to be a force 
multiplier for good. This latent utility could significantly strengthen ongoing national 
security efforts in the cyber realm.  
A. ANONYMOUS, THE NEW WORLD HACKERS, AND TELECOMIX 
Arguably the most well-known hacktivist organization of the day, Anonymous, is 
a “decentralized group of international activist hackers [that] has been linked to numerous 
high-profile incidents over the years, including internet attacks on governments, major 
corporations, financial institutions and religious groups.”120 Anonymous does not have a 
specific leader, and its membership is comprised of individuals from around the globe. 
Significant cyberattacks for which they have received public admiration include 
#OpEgypt. This specific hack supported the “Arab Spring uprising specifically in Tunisia 
and Egypt, to keep access to the Internet open for organizers on the ground.”121 For their 
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efforts, Time Magazine honored the hacktivist organization with a spot on their Most 
Influential People: 2012 list.122 
Anonymous has inspired the creation of other hacktivist groups such as the New 
World Hackers and Telecomix. New World Hackers consists of a group of 12 hackers 
who previously took part in Anonymous's #OpParis, the campaign meant to identify and 
silence ISIS members working on Twitter after the November 13, 2015, Paris massacres. 
New World Hackers tactics include a DDoS weapon called “the ‘BangStresser’ tool 
[which disabled] all of the BBC’s websites for a period of several hours in December 
2015.”123 This same tactic has since been used to successfully disrupt websites associated 
with terrorist groups, Presidential campaign webpages, and government websites.  
Telecomix is a hacktivist organization with no affiliation to Anonymous, whose 
members consider themselves “citizens of the Internet” and are a loose-knit group of 
globally distributed hackers.124 A Forbes article states Telecomix “was created at a 
Gothenburg conference in 2009 to oppose the European Union’s so-called Telecoms 
Package, industry-influenced laws that would have cut Internet access for anyone 
repeatedly downloading copyrighted files.”125 While their mission began with the 
promotion of free speech online, following the Blue Coat discovery, which revealed 
American technology had been assisting the Syrian government in spying on its people, 
“it now aims to also expose those who fight against that ideal, including any Western tech 
firm aiding the wrong side.”126  
From these summations of various hacker groups, it appears all hackers operate 
under the same supposition as Captain Barbosa, skipper of the Black Pearl, who 
describes the Pirate Code, i.e. the law, “as more what you’d call ‘guidelines’ than actual 
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rules.”127 To further clarify, the interpretation of the law and lawful activities, vary by 
group and their specific agenda. Unfortunately, the rise in cyberattacks continues to stoke 
the flames of public aversion towards the hacker community as a whole. However, during 
my meeting with Beau Woods, deputy director of the Cyber Statecraft Initiative at the 
Atlantic Council and co-founder of The Cavalry, his position on cybersecurity 
researchers and hacktivists converted my outlook to a more encouraging estimation of the 
hacker community at large.  
B. I AM THE CAVALRY 
The Cavalry identifies itself as a security research organization that operates 
within the confines of the law.128 Their mission statement declares that “The Cavalry is a 
grassroots organization that is focused on issues where computer security intersects 
public safety and human life. The areas of focus for The Cavalry are medical 
devices, automobiles, home electronics and public infrastructure.”129 Mr. Woods believes 
that “our dependence on technology is growing at a rate faster than our ability to 
safeguard ourselves.”130  
The Cavalry’s initiatives include: 
• To selectively improve visibility and awareness of these issues while 
preserving trust. 
• To inform decision makers in public policy, manufacturing, oversight, and 
customer organizations so they take smart risks. 
• To collaborate among all stakeholders, deal with concerns, and find a 
common way forward where everyone wins. 
• To catalyze, amplify, and demonstrate public good done by security 
research of consequence. 
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• To promote systems thinking that examines interdependencies and 
externalities, not just pieces of the whole.131 
Introducing the above initiatives at hacktivist events such as DEFCON and 
BSides, Mr. Woods and fellow hackers from The Cavalry have received much support 
from members within the hacker community. Mr. Woods likens hacktivist values of 
citizenship and the advancement of individual freedoms to Rousseau’s social contract,132 
where “we have a shared ownership and responsibility of these risks with other 
stakeholders, and want to be proactive. The way forward is collaboration and 
leadership.”133  
The Cavalry’s efforts, foundation, and mission statement appear transparent, 
legal, and ethical. Their efforts to promote public safety and human life by way of 
increased understanding and discussion of computer security appear ethically acceptable. 
A recent experiment by two hacktivists demonstrates the fact cyber researchers are 
mobilizing on their own to identify vulnerabilities in software and networks, the results of 
which, appear to be a valuable resource for the country’s national security efforts.  
According to an article in the Washington Post, in July 2015, “security 
researchers Charlie Miller and Chris Valasek demonstrated that they could hijack a 
vehicle over the Internet, without any dealership-installed device to ease access. By 
hacking into a 2014 Jeep Cherokee, the researchers were able to turn the steering wheel, 
briefly disable the brakes, and shut down the engine.”134 Following the manual ignition 
of the Jeep Cherokee, conducted by inserting and turning the actual jeep key, the two 
security researchers “found the vehicle’s Internet address and, while sitting in [their] 
office and typing on a MacBook Pro, hacked in through the Uconnect dashboard 
information and entertainment system.” 
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According to the developers of the Controller Area Network (CAN), a CAN bus 
“is a serial communications protocol which efficiently supports distributed real-time 
control with a very high level of security. Its domain of application ranges from high-
speed networks to low-cost multiplex wiring. In automotive electronics, engine control 
units, sensors, anti-skid systems, etc. are connected using CAN with bitrates up to 1 
Mbit/s. At the same time, it is cost effective to build into vehicle body electronics, e.g., 
lamp clusters, electric windows etc., to replace the wiring harness otherwise required.”135  
It was this exploitation of the CAN bus that caused “Charlie Miller and Chris 
Valasek [to grab] headlines last year by showing how they could kill a Jeep Cherokee's 
engine while it was traveling down a highway. The news prompted an embarrassing 
recall of 1.4 million Jeeps and other vehicles by parent company Fiat Chrysler.”136 
Fortunately, because legislative amendments had been passed to mitigate the legal 
constraints pertaining to the act of “circumventing access-control measures”137 in 
vehicles, Miller and Valasek could safely exploit these vulnerabilities for research and 
then present their findings to the Auto Alliance. Because communication platforms were 
accessible in the company, appropriate updates were made and patches created, thwarting 
future remote hacks of the system.  
In a subsequent appraisal of the Auto Alliance’s ability to patch the vulnerability, 
Miller and Valasek attempted to remote hack the Jeep while attending DEFCON 2016. 
The two security researchers were unable to find a way to do it. Fiat Chrysler argued that 
it was no longer possible, thanks to the changes they had made after Miller and Valasek’s 
July 2015 hack.138  
While hacks by Anonymous and New World Hackers grip the nation’s attention, 
grassroots hacktivists like Beau Woods, Charlie Miller, and Chris Valasek are devoting 
their time and energy to overshadowing the negative opinion of those who hack for evil 
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purposes. Through engagement, more of these patriotic hacktivists could be cultivated 
and empowered to bring their pre-existing skill sets to bear to bolster the resources and 
capacity of the national security apparatus in this “era of digital warfare.”139  
As the number of devices and people connected to the Internet of Things 
continues to grow at a rapid rate, leaders in the government, private industry, and civilian 
population have opted for unconventional collaborative methods to battle the emerging 
cyber threat. Leaders in government, the military, and private industry are recognizing 
the impacts of cyber intrusions “are more long term than immediate,”140 and the 
following initiatives demonstrate proactive efforts being made to counter these threats.  
C. BUG BOUNTY 
No organization is so powerful that it does not need outside help 
identifying security issues, and this includes the Pentagon. Top companies 
rely on these bug bounty programs to improve their security, like Google, 
Facebook, Microsoft, Uber, Github, Twitter, Yahoo, and hundreds more. 
To be the most powerful, you must be open about your vulnerabilities, 
seek the help of others, and take corrective action quickly.141 
As described in a FederalTimes article, bug bounties operate under “a concept 
that is relatively simple: An organization incentivizes outside researchers—or white-hat 
hackers—to test the security of its networks and applications and report what they find so 
that the organization can address the vulnerabilities.”142 The cost effectiveness and quick 
turnaround time provide leaders in the private technology industry with a method of 
identifying vulnerabilities within systems and software.  
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The article goes on to say, “The Defense Digital Service (DDS), the Department 
of Defense’s arm of the White House’s U.S. Digital Service” decided to “follow in the 
footsteps of leading technology brands who crowdsource vulnerability discovery and 
disclosure while ensuring uptime and security.”143 WIRED magazine demonstrates the 
growing utility of crowdsourcing in private industry with the following explanation: 
“Technological advances in everything from product design software to digital video 
cameras are breaking down the cost barriers that once separated amateurs from 
professionals. Hobbyists, part-timers, and dabblers suddenly have a market for their 
efforts. …The labor isn’t always free, but it costs a lot less than paying traditional 
employees. It’s not outsourcing; its crowdsourcing.”144 Nevertheless, as efficient as 
crowdsourcing appears to be, its ability to provide a long-term solution to identifying and 
preventing cyber vulnerabilities remains to be seen.  
D. HACK THE PENTAGON PROGRAM 
According to Clarke and Knake, members of the hacker community meet at 
various times and locations throughout the country to participate in sponsored 
hackathons.145 Describing a hacktivist conference he attended in Las Vegas, Clarke 
stated that he witnessed “a gathering of ‘white hat’ or ‘ethical’ hackers, people who are or 
work for chief of information officers (CIOs) or chief information security officers 
(CISOs) at banks, pharmaceutical firms, universities, government agencies, almost every 
imaginable kind of large (and many medium-sized) company.”146 Individuals or teams 
would then attempt to expose vulnerabilities in the current software of the day. In order to 
benefit from these individuals’ capacities in the cyber realm, Clarke proposed giving the 
hackers a means to communicate observed vulnerabilities in a system to the software 
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company and the government.147 This progressive foresight was finally realized in April 
of 2016. 
Then Secretary of defense Ash Carter stated that “the Defense Department is 
investing aggressively in innovation, including in people, practices, and technologies, 
[and that] the ‘Hack the Pentagon’ program combined all those elements to ‘considerable 
success’”:148 
The pilot program was conducted against publicly available websites 
[defense.gov, dodlive.mil, dvidshub.net, myafn.net, and dimoc.mil], 
according to Chris Lynch, the director of the Defense Digital Service, the 
DoD agency that led the program. Mission-critical systems were not 
involved, he pointed out. He said they were looking for vulnerabilities that 
would allow someone to gain access to a system through a current user or 
allow a hacker to maliciously gain access to other networks or other 
systems.149 
The DDS director’s specific consideration to focus on public websites is 
consistent with recent threat reporting that identifies how “[hackers] trawl user data in 
hopes a small target will lead to a big one,” according to the New York Times.150 
“The participants in the bug bounty [were] required to register and submit to a 
background check prior to any involvement with the pilot program. Once vetted, these 
hackers” participated in a crowdsourcing event that spanned the globe.151 “The power of 
a bug bounty program lies in the large number of highly skilled hackers looking at your 
code. Hackers’ reports poured in from 44 states. California was the most active state, 
with U.S. expat participants based as far away as Japan, Germany, and England.”152 
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According to FederalTimes, “the Hack the Pentagon program ran from April 18 
through May 12, during which time 252 vetted hackers submitted at least one 
vulnerability report each, for a total of 1,189 reports. As the hacker reports were 
submitted, DDS and DMA worked to qualify and remediate each vulnerability in real 
time with support from HackerOne.”153 HackerOne is a private organization that 
conducts vulnerability testing for companies. HackerOne CEO noted that “within 13 
minutes of launching the first U.S. government commercial bug bounty program, we had 
our first submission. Just six hours later, that number grew to nearly 200.”154 Notably, 
the age range of active hackers who reported a vulnerability that warranted a bounty was 
between 14 and 53, which highlights the broad demographic of those participating and 
significantly contributing to this crowdsourcing event.155 The cost effectiveness of this 
sort of program cannot be overstated. “The total contract value for Hack the Pentagon 
reports that qualified for the bounty, including the paid-out bounties, was approximately 
$150,000. In Secretary of Defense Ash Carter’s estimation, DoD would have spent more 
than $1 million uncovering the same vulnerabilities if it had undergone its typical process 
of hiring an outside firm to conduct a security audit and vulnerability assessment.”156  
With 138 vulnerabilities patched within a month of concluding the program, the 
Hack the Pentagon program was indeed a major step forward in the Pentagon’s efforts to 
collaborate with hacktivisits.157 While I acknowledge an extensive system of vetting 
must be created in order to evaluate future members of the hacker militia, I caution those 
who are tasked to create such a formula to consider that even the most vetted individuals 
possess the capacity to breach security protocols. Look no further than the likes of 
Edward Snowden and former secretary of state and presidential candidate Hillary Clinton 
to illustrate that point. Accepting the risk of inviting outsiders to collaborate in an 
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unconventional method proved to be a profitable investment for the Pentagon. 
Unconventional problem-solving initiatives such as the Hack the Pentagon program 




A. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
Realizing how adversaries such as Russia and China utilize cyberwarfare strategy 
to promote their national agendas is a fundamental first step in recognizing the threats in 
cyber space. The second critical step is determining proactive initiatives that have the 
potential to secure American “effective use” in the sphere of cyber space.158 A Tripwire 
report on cyberattacks from January 2016 notes, “According to [a 2015 Department of 
Homeland Security] end-of-year report by the Industrial Control Systems Cybersecurity 
Emergency Response Team (ICS-CERT), investigators responded to 295 reported 
incidents involving critical infrastructure in the U.S., compared to 245 in the previous 
year.”159 With criminal and critical infrastructure cyberattacks thus on the rise, a bold 
question should be asked: have the number of threats in cyberspace outpaced the 
resources at the disposal of the national security apparatus? If that is the case, could the 
integration of unconventional collaborative methods augment the existing resources and 
capabilities of SOCOM and CYBERCOM in order to preclude future attacks? 
As the world becomes more interconnected, private sector vulnerabilities 
represent a liability towards our national security. Threats to the private or civilian sector 
from state or non-state actors, presents an exemplary gray zone challenge for the U.S. 
government. As the efficacy of hacktivists is realized, the utility of these individuals and 
similarly contracted organizations becomes increasingly obvious. Yet what now is a cost-
effective method of conducting penetration testing on systems and software may not 
always be so. With the IRS launching a bug bounty program like Hack the Pentagon, and 
with the U.S. Army announcing its intent to “[follow] the Pentagon’s lead,”160 it appears 
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time for the U.S. government to leverage its population’s existing human capital for 
national security reasons. 
While tech giants Google and Amazon boast the benefits of crowdsourcing on 
their security webpages, it is not the time to designate an unsubstantiated silver bullet 
when a 2015 congressional report states that “the United States is ill prepared to defend 
itself from cyber espionage when its adversary is determined, centrally coordinated, and 
technically sophisticated, as is the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and government.”161 
Nor is it the time when Russia is subsidizing state-sponsored hackers to promote its 
national agenda. The same report says that “American companies are being forced to 
fight a battle against adversaries possessing nation-state capabilities, which is not a fair 
fight,”162 “the status quo is no longer acceptable,”163 and the American people deserve 
better. Leon Fuerth’s article “Cyberpower from the Presidential Perspective” maintains 
“It will be necessary to have a policy and management system dedicated to cyberpower, 
but it must also be fully integrated into all other systems that exist for the purpose of 
sustaining power of the United States and the well being of its citizens.”164 While open 
source crowdsourcing initiatives should still be leveraged, it would be unwise to rely 
entirely on this method to respond and defend against cyber threats.  
According to The Cavalry’s Beau Woods, continuous engagement with the hacker 
community has the possibility of creating a foundation that cultivates the empowerment 
of would-be patriotic and ethical hacktivists. Mr. Woods believes that hackers are 
motivated by “the six Ps; Protector, Puzzler, Profit, Prestige, Politics, and Patriotism.”165 
The last of the Ps was specifically underscored in an article written by HackerOne CEO 
Martin Mickos at the conclusion of the Hack the Pentagon program. Mr. Mickos noted 
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that “we regularly hear that hackers are driven by the intellectual challenge, rewards, 
resume building, and improving their skills. This pilot, in particular, highlighted a 
motivation that is often overlooked: altruism. Time after time, participants shared their 
desire to contribute to their country’s security. The patriotic upswell took even us at 
HackerOne by surprise, and played a central role in the program’s success.”166 Mr. 
Woods and Mr. Mickos’s summations substantiate the militia’s critical skill of 
maintaining the pulse of their community and surging its ranks when threatened by an 
adversary.  
B. APPLICABILITY IN SOCOM: OFFENSE AND DEFENSE 
There is nothing conventional about cyberspace operations, and there is 
nothing conventional about a cyberwarrior. 
— Mårten Mickos, 2016167 
 
Increased funding and training from the 1st Special Regiment, GROM, has 
validated the efforts of Poland’s TDF. With similar initiatives in America, vetted hacker 
militias could improve SOCOM’s preparedness of strategic and operational endeavors. 
While tethered to SOCOM, the hacker militia would keep a pulse on ongoing initiatives 
and conduct proper risk assessments and training while maintaining enough autonomy so 
as not to slow the pace of their work. “In order to be agile at the speed of the Net, a big 
traditional force structure organization is not going to work in cyber or cyberwarrior 
organizations,” said Josh Hartman, former congressional staffer and Defense Department 
executive. Regarding its relationship with CYBERCOM’s cyberspace operations support, 
Special Operations Publication 3-05 maintains that “Elements provided to SOF units may 
require additional training or equipment to effectively and safely facilitate cyberspace 
support during special operations.”168 Retaining hacker militia units under SOCOM 
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could alleviate such time consuming endeavors and improve SOCOM’s efficiency in the 
emerging battle space of the cyber realm.  
A RAND publication entitled “The Other Quiet Professionals,” stated, “Both SOF 
and cyber forces are, at their operating core, small teams of highly skilled specialists, and 
both communities value skilled personnel above all else. Irregular warfare and SOF 
doctrine lagged operational activities, and the same is true of the cyber force.”169 
Through collaboration, SOCOM could take a leadership role in shaping the future of 
CYBERCOM and the volunteer hacktivist militia. Learning from past mistakes, SOCOM 
could begin by encouraging initial discourse about cyber threat response and prevention. 
This sort of convergence would increase the overall efficiency of all parties involved.  
Max Strasser’s article “Why Ukraine Hasn’t Sparked a Big Cyberwar, So Far” 
explains how the Russian Federation “subcontracts much of its cyberwarfare to nonstate 
actors.”170 The aforementioned analysis of APT 28 and China’s Third and Fourth 
Departments, lends credence to this statement, and although many major defense 
contracting firms actively support ongoing national security initiatives of the USG, a 
hacker militia supports what these contracted companies cannot; a national message of 
resilience and an adaptive organizational model that could be effectively paired with 
SOCOM both offensively and defensively. A message of resilience towards cyber threats 
does not currently exist in our country. A volunteer hacktivist militia supports the 
message that our country’s citizenry is mobilizing to the influx of cyber threats against 
individuals and critical infrastructure. While I acknowledge there are likely numerous 
efforts being made behind the scenes, the ability to promote a message of resiliency to the 
citizens of the United States by the citizens of the United States, has the potential to 
foster a stronger, more resilient country.  
SOCOM’s white paper “The Gray Zone” states “centralized government is 
becoming more expensive and less effective, while the tools available to non-state actors 
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are trending the opposite way.”171 Harnessing the skills of our country’s talented 
volunteer hacktivists will complement ongoing national security efforts by bringing all 
instruments of national power to bear against our enemies. The utility of a hacker militia 
that augments ongoing SOCOM and CYBERCOM resources and capabilities cannot be 
overstated. Involvement in Phase Zero preparation of the environment by way of special 
reconnaissance and improving transition time between multiple targets, similar to current 
battle space handover procedures, would expedite the national security apparatus’ ability 
to prosecute cyber threats. However, where the hacker militia would realize its true 
potential was in its convergence with SOCOM. Fully understanding SOCOM’s mission 
and intent is a unique sort of knowledge that the hacker militia could leverage in order to 
predict future offensive and defensive needs and requirements of SOCOM operators, 
thereby increasing overall efficiency of their mission. 
An article entitled “An Emerging Synthesis for a New Way of War,” by James 
Callard and Peter Faber, underscores the importance of “examining and evaluating an 
opponent’s possible innovations and countermeasures.”172 The aforementioned analysis 
of Unrestricted Warfare demonstrates the unconventional mindset leaders within the PLA 
are aggressively exploring. James A. Lewis Simon Hansen’s article “China’s Emerging 
Cyberpower: Elite Discourse and Political Aspirations” highlights China’s “concern 
about social volatility is evident in China’s discourse on cyberpower.”173 The perceived 
power cyberspace has to promote China’s international standing, has a reciprocal effect 
domestically, where Chinese leaders recognize the potential cyber space has to cause 
instability from within its population.  
Recognizing these vulnerabilities, the USG should maintain the capacity to 
exploit those weaknesses when necessary. General Votel’s article “Unconventional 
Warfare in the Gray Zone” referenced methods such as sabotage and subversion that had 
been effectively utilized by members of historical resistance efforts. These very 
approaches could be leveraged by a volunteer hacktivist militia against foreign enemies 
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who threaten national resources via hybrid warfare in cyber space. General Votel 
specifically highlights,  
Subversive activities such as mass protests, work slowdowns or stoppages, 
boycotts, infiltration of government offices, and the formation of front 
groups. These activities are primarily aimed at undermining the military, 
economic, psychological, or political strength or morale of the government 
or occupation authority. …Sabotage can be a means of physically 
damaging the government’s military or industrial production facilities, 
economic resources, or other targets.174  
The utility of an integrated hacker militia cannot be overstated. Under the banner of 
SOCOM, mission specific hacktivist militias would have the unique appreciation and 
understanding of the direction the SOF community was headed, which would allow the 
hacktivists to preemptively converge their assets and knowledge with ongoing USG 
efforts. Callard and Faber’s article states, “A better means used alone will not prevail 
over multiple means used together.”175 
Programs such as Hack the Pentagon, HackerOne, and I am the Cavalry represent 
opportunities for the national security apparatus to increase its scope in both resources 
and capacity to defend appropriately to cyberattacks. Safeguarding SOCOM’s 
commercially procured communications equipment is paramount. Special Operations 
Joint Publication 3-05 states, “SOF communications systems must leverage national 
cyberspace capabilities, systems and services to the maximum extent possible.”176 This 
passage in Joint Publication 3-05 references CYBERCOM as the supporting element. 
However, resources and capabilities are limited with their 133 Cyber Mission Force units. 
Vetted hacktivists in the form of a hacker militia possess the latent force multiplier 
capacity that, if coordinated properly under the direction of SOCOM, could augment 
ongoing efforts by the national security apparatus to defend against cyber threats.  
Dr. Dorothy Denning, distinguished professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, 
recommended the investigation of practices related to a militia could theoretically 
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conduct penetration testing on government systems and software, networks that require 
the highest security.177  
In this context, “Red teaming is a process designed to detect network and system 
vulnerabilities and test security by taking an attacker-like approach to 
system/network/data access. This process is also called ‘ethical hacking’ since its 
ultimate purpose is to enhance security.”178 In order to maximize its effectiveness in 
penetration testing, 
it must be carried out with the utmost confidentiality [where the] customer 
sets the scope of the project to specify the area of information to be 
assessed. Before the Red Team can proceed, several legal considerations 
must be addressed. The team must have explicit and direct permission to 
perform the test from the customer. This should also include a waiver of 
repercussions in the event a disaster should occur in the process of 
testing.179  
Enlisting the assistance of hacktivists who possess the mission specific skill sets 
necessary to augment the aforementioned defensive and offensive activities has the 
potential to bolster ongoing USG cyber security initiatives. Serving under the 
coordination and leadership of SOCOM should satisfy the tenets of the Cybersecurity 
National Action Plan’s (CNAP) “long-term strategy to enhance cybersecurity awareness 
and protections, protect privacy, maintain public safety as well as economic and national 
security, and empower Americans to take better control of their digital security.”180 
Combined with ongoing cybersecurity initiatives, the resources and capabilities provided 
by volunteer hacktivists will bridge existing strategic and operational gaps between 
SOCOM and CYBERCOM, thus improving U.S. national security and resiliency. 
The findings of this research validate the prospect of creating a hacker militia. 
Creating such an organization on an experimental basis would demonstrate the potential 
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of these volunteer hacktivists. Aligning their pre-existing skill sets with the SOCOM 
community will require an appropriate vetting process, one that has the potential to deter 
some prospective volunteers. Nevertheless, as history has demonstrated with the colonial 
rebels of the United States and the Territorial Defense Forces of Poland, when the 
country is threatened, the population will mobilize. The USG must leverage its existing 
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